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Introduction
It s a pleasure to be here today and to have an opportunity to speak as part 
of this series of talks on an issue of fundamental importance
No one comes to the subject of nuclear weapons and arms control without some 
particular perspective I believe it important to tell you my perspective so 
you can be aware of it in evaluating what I say
I believe the problem of nuclear weapons is important and urgent 
I also believe that limitations and reductions m  nuclear weapons are 
more likely to guarantee our future security than is a continued arms 
race
I was not initially a supporter of the nuclear freeze idea, but I ve changed 
my mind I was asked to speak today to the question of whether a freeze can 
be verified
Perhaps the first thing to do in addressing the verifiability of a nuclear 
freeeze is to ask, what is our purpose7 Most mornings I remind myself of 
Nietzsche s observation that the most common form of human stupidity is 
forgetting what one is trying to do
Our Purpose
I think our first purpose must be to prevent nuclear war Not to stop the 
nuclear arms race, or to improve relations between the US and the Soviet 
Union, or to insist that "enough is enough", or even to save money These 
isues are undoubtedly related, and may also be important in achieving other 
significant objectives, such as economic strength and a just society But our 
first goal must be to prevent nuclear war, and especially all-out nuclear war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union So I would like to focus 
today on that
I also think we have to recognize at the outset, and keep reminding ourselves 
along the way, that no course of action in this area is free of risk Any 
arms control agreement carries with it some risk Certainly an intense 
competition in weaponry carries risk What we have to ask ourselves is not 
how to achieve a world that is risk-free that is impossible But rather, are 
the risks acceptable in light of our overall goals7 and what are the risks of 
alternative courses7
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What Tools Do We Have for Preventing Nuclear War7
There are a variety, including
* Improved relations between countries
* Arms control agreements
* Unilateral actions, such as weapons choices
* Improved conflict resolution procedures
* Improved crisis communications
I m sure you can think of others Within this broader framework, a freeze may 
be seen as one important approach to arms control
What Do I Mean by a Freeze7
It is important at the outset to differentiate between the general concept of 
a freeze and particular constructions of this concept The central idea is 
to halt and roll back the nuclear arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in all areas This is usually stated as "an immediate mutual and 
verifiable freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear 
weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear 
weapons, followed by reductions " Freeze advocates have been very smart in 
keeping the proposal as general as possible The goal is to achieve as broad 
a set of limitations as one can
How does a freeze differ from other arms control ideas7 Primarily by adopting 
a comprehensive approach We can see this by comparing it with SALT and 
START SALT was essentially a step-by-step approach that focused on closing 
off particular avenues of competition, but never got beyond closing off areas 
that neither side was much interested m  anyway START is an approach that 
focused, at least initially, on obtaining large reductions m  one narrow area 
the Arnims trat ion is very concerned about, namely large Soviet land-based 
missiles, while vigorously continuing the race in all others At least so 
far, START has not addressed the current "growth areas" of the arms race, such 
as ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, increased missile 
accuracy, and weapons in space Indeed, the Administration has said it will 
proceed with a vigorous nuclear arms build-up adding some 17,000 warheads of 
new design over the next few years In contrast, the FREEZE confronts these 
new developments head-on
A freeze would help to prevent nuclear war in at least two ways First, many 
of the weapons scheduled for deployment by the US and the Soviet Union during 
the next few years are vulnerable while at the same time being designed to 
strike with little or no warning at the leadership and command structure of 
the adversary They are therefore crisis-destabilizing A freeze now would 
prevent the deployment of these weapons Second, the arms race itself creates 
heightened fear, mistrust, and tension between the United States and the 
Soviet Union Most Americans have no personal animosity toward Russians, nor 
do most Russians that I have met have any personal animosity toward Americans 
Yet both greatly fear the governments of the other The nuclear arras race 
itself heightens this fear, increasing the danger of war by accident, 
miscalculation, or preemption A freeze would interrupt this cycle
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Gould a Freeze Be Verified?
Verification of any arms control agreement has two components
1 Finding out what s going on (monitoring) and
2 Deciding whether it s allowed (verifying compliance)
Our ability to monitor Soviet activities depends mostly on our ability to 
gather the right information Our ability to decide whether a given activity 
is allowed often depends on how well the agreement has been written
Generally speaking, the broader an agreement, the easier it is to monitor and 
verify First, most developments are harder to spot against a background of 
widespread and intense weapons development activity than against little or no 
such activity Second, deciding whether something is or is not happening is 
usually easier than deciding whether something is happening just this much or 
actually a little bit more
An example of the latter is provided by encryption of telemetry from missiles 
during fiight tests This came up during the SALT talks The simplest thing 
would have been to ban encryption This would have been easy to verify (you
fü" rie11 vefj easily whether someone is encrypting data transmissions) But
the US wanted to deny certain information to the Soviets, so we refused to ban
H . Í 7 w » 0n Inst®ad> "e a8ree<l only that "Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification, of compliance with 
the provisions of this Treaty" (emphasis added) That is, concealment 
measures that do not impede verification were allowed
As was realized full well at the time, such vague wording opens the door for 
iffenng interpretations by the two parties and increases the likelihood of 
dispute But the US felt this likelihood was less important than retaining
abil1.lty t0 enc5ypt part of the data stream It is not at all surprising 
then that rumors of US disatxsfaction with the level of Soviet encryption in 
several recent missile tests have surfaced in the public press They have 
usually been cited as examples of Soviet perfidy, even though such 
disagreements are to be expected with such vague wording Fortunately the 
SALT agreement provides a procedure for resolving such disputes
t eePar?£e ar8ument for a broad agreement is that stopping a program entirely 
rather than just a part, decreases the risk of one country gaining advantage 
by abrogating the agreement (the danger of so-called breakout) 8
For all these reasons, the comprehensiveness of a broad freeze would assist
decide^ wha t° ° ^  * *'**** ade<“ataly verified’ Herí íe ha!decide what we mean by adequate verification Do we
1 tA at lt: must be P°ssible to verify compliance with every Individual limitation in the agreement with very high
precision This is a very stringent standard, and the one that 
was applied to SALT II Or do we
2 Mean instead that any undetected cheating must have no significant 
military consequences This standard is less stringent, but may 
be more reasonable in view of our aim, which is not to nail the 
Soviets on some minor point, but to prevent nuclear war
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There is a broad consensus among defense experts that the first, more strin­
gent, verification standard could be met today for a freeze
on production, testing, and deployment of
* aircraft
* submarines
on testing and deployment of
* land-based ballistic missiles of all ranges
* long-range submarine, ship, and air-based ballistic missiles
* long-range cruise missiles of all kinds
and on testing of
* nuclear explosives
Here long-range systems are those with ranges greater than 1,000 km
The second verification standard (undetected cheating must have no significant 
military consequences) could likely be met today for a much broader freeze, 
including a freeze on weapons-grade fissionable material
Let me briefly describe some of our means of verification and their ability to 
monitor a freeze Here it may be worth noting that verification of arms 
control agreements has always posed a problem for the US On the one hand, 
the government would like to keep the Soviets in the dark about our 
capabilities as much as possible On the other hand, the US public is highly 
suspicious and demands details about how we can verify agreements that have 
been made Generally speaking, our capabilities exceed those that have been 
revealed publicly For example, in the heat of the SALT II ratification 
debate, President Carter stated officially for the first time that we have 
optical reconaissance satellites Needless to say, this capability surprised 
no one who had been paying any attention to these matters
Our verification resources include national technical means, cooperative 
measures, consultation, and human intelligence I will say very little about 
our human intelligence, except to note that it is apparently not all that bad 
according to Congressional testimony of DoD officials, we monitor the activity 
at Soviet design bureaus and production plants well enough that we have been 
able to predict every ICBM before testing began
National Technical Means (NTM)
These include ground-based and sea-based optical telescopes, radars, and 
listening posts as well as surveillance satellites The US has ground-based 
listening posts in Turkey, in Norway, and even in China Soviet missile 
warheads fired over their test ranges to impact areas on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula or in the Western Pacific are tracked during the high-altitude 
portion of their flights by the ’’Cobra Dane" phased-array radar on Shemya 
Island The ship-borne "Cobra Judy" phased-array radar is used to track their 
final descent
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According to published reports, the capabilities of our satellites alone are 
substantial Among the types we now have are
1 Optical reconnaissance satellites that take pictures of objects on 
land and sea Examples Include search-and-find satellites, such as KH-11 
(with a ground resolution of 60") and Big Bird (11") In addition, we have 
close-look satellites, such as the USAF High Resolution satellite (3") The 
infrared detectors on such satellites allow photo Interpreters to detect 
camouflage by differentiating between live and dead or artificial foliage, to 
reveal hidden objects by the heat they give off, and to monitor the energy 
consumed or released by factories
2 Infrared sensor satellites that detect the exhaust from missiles 
launched on land or at sea and immediately notify ground stations An example 
is the TRW Code 647 We reportedly have launched four such satellites into 
geostationary orbits above the Soviet missile test complex at Tyuratam 
Presently these are able to determine the number of missiles launched and the 
general area of the launch Development of satellites capable of determining 
which silos the missiles came from is underway
3 Side-looking radar satellites that can see through clouds and 
photograph objects that contrast with their surroundings Such satellites 
have sufficient resolution to detect and identify relatively large objects, 
such as ships at sea
4 Electronic intelligence satellites that intercept Soviet 
communications and radar signals Examples include the Rhyolite, which uses 
highly sensitive directional antennas to intercept telemetry from Soviet 
missiles in flight, and the Ferret, which monitors Soviet satellite signals 
and ground communications
5 Nuclear explosion detectors, such as the Vela Hotel satellites, which 
use optical, X-ray, and gamma-ray detectors to spot nuclear explosions on the 
earth or in space
Some idea of the verification capabilities provided by these resources may be 
obtained by examining the public record For example, the US government has 
regularly reported publicly on the status of the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 
modernization programs, indicating that any significant change in the status 
of these programs is verifiable Each year, the US Defense Intelligence 
Agency lists for Congress the number of intermediate range and 
intercontinental missiles produced that year by the Soviets, as well as the 
number deployed These reports cover not only large items, like ICBMs, but 
also tanks, fighter planes, and even artillery pieces In 1981, the DIA 
reported that the Soviets have 37 plants that produce aircraft components and 
49 that produce missile components
Verification of a halt to production of militarily significant quantities of 
weapons-grade fissionable material by national technical (as well as other) 
means appears to be comparatively easy Both countries already have more than 
100,000 kg of weapons-grade U-235 as well as plutonium, so any secret 
production capacity would have to be very large to have any security 
significance A plant that could produce significant quantities of enriched 
uraniun or plutonium would of necessity be large, and could not possibly 
escape detection The existing weapons production plants in the Soviet Union
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are well known, and it would be obvious if they were continued in operation 
Construction of new plants could be easily spotted Diversion of material 
from nuclear power plants could not add significantly to the existing 
stockpile for many years IAEA safeguards, while insufficient to detect 
diversion of material for one bomb, could very easily detect diversions of any 
security significance for the US and the Soviet Union The Soviet Union has 
recently indicated its willingness to accept such safeguards on its power 
reactors
A freeze now would prevent deployment of certain systems, such as ground- and 
sea-launched cruise missiles and antisatellite (ASAT) weapons that are 
difficult to monitor Deployment of these weapons would greatly complicate 
the verification of any future arms control agreements This is particularly 
true of the US ASAT weapon, which is very small (the actual interceptor 
measures only 12” by 13") and can be launched by an F-15 fighter plane from 
airbases around the world It is scheduled for testing against targets in 
space early next year If this testing is allowed to take place, there will 
be very little hope for a treating banning or limiting ASAT weapons because of 
the extreme difficulty of detecting the US vehicle The much more primitive 
and ineffective Soviet weapon poses no such difficulties Flight testing by 
the US is particularly regrettable, because the US has much more to lose than 
the Soviets if effective ASATs are deployed The Soviets appear willing to 
ban ASATs and in fact have offered a very reasonable draft of such a treaty 
Negotiation of such a treaty was declared US policy until the Reagan 
Administration, but Reagan has refused to discuss the matter
Cooperative Measures and Consultation
These include exchanges of data, assistance to NTM, on-site sensors, and 
legally-mandated reviews of complaints or questions
In SALT, for example the Soviets gave us lists of their weapons showing the 
numbers they had deployed Generally speaking, they have proved increasingly 
willing to agree to such data exchange, quite possibly because they recognize 
that the US government faces a serious problem in defending the verifiability 
of arms control agreements to the US public
Assistance to NTM includes both limitations (such as bans on encryption of 
telemetry or deliberate concealment) and affirmative actions (such as advance 
notice of tests, declaration of distinctive weapon features, or identification 
of production facilities)
During the Carter Administration the Soviets agreed to on-site inspections and 
unmanned seismic stations in the Soviet Union during negotiations aimed at 
banning all nuclear weapons testing, these measures appear adequate to verify 
compliance down to 1 kt or even less Any risks from cheating below this 
level are minor and are certainly less than the risks of continued testing and 
unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons
The Standing Consultative Commission mandated by the SALT I agreement has 
provided a place where complaints and dubious practices by both sides could be 
frankly and bluntly raised and resolved
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Cooperative measures would improve verification of a freeze on production of 
weapons For example, each country might declare the locations where the 
major components of each frozen weapons system are produced The Soviets 
would run great risks in making false declarations, since they do not know 
exactly how effective our intelligence is
Historical Experience
What has been our past experience in attempting to verify bilateral arms 
control treaties with the Soviet Union’
SALT I Each time the US or the Soviet Union suspected that the other party 
had violated the SALT I agreements, the question has been brought up in the 
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) Until the Reagan Administration took 
office, every question brought before this commission was resolved to the 
satisfaction of the United States During the period from December 1972 to 
July 1979, eight questions were raised by the US and six by the Soviets Two 
concrete examples may be of interest
During 1973 and 1974 US observations of Soviet ballistic missile tests led the 
US to believe that a radar associated with the SA-5 surface-to-air missile 
system had been used in an ambiguous manner that could have been part of an 
effort to achieve an ABM capability for the SA-5 The US raised this issue 
The Soviets responded that the radar had not been used in an ABM mode and 
shortly thereafter ceased the activity of concern to the US
Beginning in 1973 the US started using prefabricated shelters over Minuteman 
silos that were some four to ten times larger than those that had been used 
previously The Soviets complained that these were interfering with their 
ability to verify treaty compliance The US responded that the shelters were 
not intended for concealment but, after several years of further discussions 
with the Soviets, ceased using them m  May 1979
During this same period, numerous articles appeared in US newspapers and 
magazines alleging that the Soviets were cheating Charges included blinding 
of US satellites, development of a mobile ABM system, ABM testing of air 
defense missiles, development of mobile ICBMs, encryption of telemetry in such 
a way as to impede verification, and ASAT activities in violation of the 
accord None of these charges was correct However, their public impact was 
such that the State Department published a detailed summary of all the matters 
raised in the SCC and a list of unfounded charges
Charges of Soviet cheating, particularly with respect to encryption of 
telemetry and their new phased-array radar at Abalakova, have again become 
common in US newspapers and magazines Presumably these matters are being 
raised in the SCC if there actually is concern in the US government It would 
help to clear the air if the Reagan administration would provide official 
reports like those of previous administrations
Threshold Test Ban Treaty High administration officials have charged that 
the Soviets have set off 15 blasts that exceeded the 150 kt limit set by the 
treaty However, it is difficult to find any geophysicists inside or outside 
of government who believe that there is a clear-cut case Two leading 
geophysicists who have carried out research on underground testing for years
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say they have not found a single instance in which the size of a Soviet test 
has exceeded the threshold Some of the alleged violations could actually 
fall under the "whoops” provision of the treaty This provision recognizes 
the difficulty of estimating test yields in advance, and allows each side one 
or two unintended breaches of the 150 kt limit per year The threshold test 
ban treaty is another good example of the difficulty of verifying partial 
limits
In summary, there have been no surprises in verifying previous bilateral arms 
control treaties with the Soviet Union and their record of compliance has been 
a good one
Concluding Remarks
It is important to remember that arms control is not a zero-sum game in a 
good agreement, both sides benefit This in itself reduces the motivation for 
cheating Given the advantages to the Soviet Union of making an agreement in 
the-first place, any gains from cheating would have to be substantial in order 
to justify the risk of detection and consequent suspension of the agreement, 
as well as the intense military build-up by the West that would almost 
certainly follow Furthermore, the heroic concealment measures that would 
generally be necessary in order to escape detection would result in 
substantial reductions in technical and operational effectiveness, as well as 
a reduction in confidence in the weapons system
Many verification questions have not yet been resolved Detecting and 
counting so-called dual capable systems, such as aircraft or missiles that can 
carry either nuclear or conventional explosives, is relatively easy, but 
figuring out how to incorporate them into a nuclear weapons agreement needs 
some fresh creative thinking Monitoring of very small weapons is difficult, 
and could benefit from new ideas Monitoring of production of fissionable 
materials could be improved So we do not yet know precisely where the limits 
are in what could be included in a verifiable freeze In this connection, it 
may be worth remarking that very little is being spent to study arms control 
proposals or technologies Even in its heyday, only lq was spent on the work 
of the Arras Control and Disarmament Agency for every $100 spent on weapons and 
military manpower This makes no sense even from a strictly military point of 
view Much could undoubtedly be accomplished if more resources were devoted 
to verification questions
Even so, we can say that the methods and technologies exist today to verify a 
very broad freeze, even if we insist on precise verification of each 
individual limit A still broader freeze is possible if we insist only that 
any undetected cheating must have no military significance
Bearing in mind our overall goal, which is to prevent nuclear war, we must ask 
ourselves whether substantial restraint in the development of Soviet weaponry 
would contribute more to US security, even with the chance of marginal 
cheating, than a continuation of unrestrained growth
The ultimate arbiter of what level of verification is acceptable in arms 
control agreements is the general public Therefore it is important for each 
of you to inform yourself about this issue, to make up your own mind about 
what level of verification you think is adequate, and to communicate this to 
the Congress and the President
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